Judiciary — High Courts, Subordinate Courts & the All India Judicial Service

GS Paper: GS Paper II | Subject: Polity | Last updated: 2026-06-24

Covers Class 4 (Mr. Veren Sharma). It continues directly from lec03 (Supreme Court jurisdiction + the Presidential Reference 2025). The class has four parts: (1) a short recap/closure of the Presidential Reference 2025 — its impact and loose ends (this is the overlap with Class 3, and uses the same Class-3 handout); (2) the High Courts — number, the relevant Articles, and which HCs cover more than one State / a Union Territory; (3) the Subordinate (District) Courts — structure, the appointment Articles 233/234, the Dheeraj Mor → Rejanish K.V. "bar-quota" case and the 3-year-practice debate; and (4) the All India Judicial Service (AIJS) — the constitutional route, the committees, the past attempts, and the full critical-evaluation (for/against) with a way-forward exam scheme.

The raw transcript file 230626-240626 actually spans more than one session (an orientation/strategy talk and a separate Union-Executive class also got recorded into it). This note captures only Veren Sharma's judiciary continuation, which is what the Class-4 board notes contain. Administrative tribunals and the role of the CJI were explicitly deferred to the next class.**


Table of Contents

  1. Recap & Closure — Presidential Reference 2025 (the Class-3 overlap)
  2. High Courts — Number & the Relevant Articles (214, 230, 231, 241)
  3. High Courts with Jurisdiction over Two+ States and over Union Territories
  4. Jurisdiction of a High Court (Original, Appellate, Writ 226, Supervisory 227/235)
  5. Benches of a Court (Single / Division / Constitution) + the Collegium-RTI point
  6. Subordinate Courts — Structure & Appointment (Arts 233, 234)
  7. The Recruitment Ladder — a Single, Unified Judiciary
  8. Dheeraj Mor → Rejanish K.V. — Can a Sitting Judge use the Bar Quota? + the 3-Year-Practice Debate
  9. All India Judicial Service (AIJS) — Constitutional Route, Committees & Attempts
  10. AIJS — Critical Evaluation (Arguments Against & In Favour) + Exam Scheme
  11. Quick Revision Tables

1. Recap & Closure — Presidential Reference 2025 (the Class-3 overlap)

EXAM FOCUS: This is the bridge from Class 3. The full treatment — the 14 questions, Articles 200/201, Art 142 "deemed assent", Art 361 immunity, the background of Govt of T.N. v. Office of the Governor — is in lec03 §8–9. This section adds the closure points the teacher made at the start of Class 4: the impact, and a few sharper framings. Use them with the lec03 diagrams (Art 200 options, Governor immunity).

The Governor's options on a State Bill (Art 200), re-stated. When a Bill passed by the State Legislature is presented, the Governor "shall declare" that he assents, withholds assent, or reserves the Bill for the President. The word "shall declare" is important: it is a constitutional obligation to say what he intends to do — it is not the discretionary "may". (Contrast: where the Constitution says "may", that itself confers discretion; here the obligation is to declare, the discretion is only in which of the three options he picks.)

Why "withhold" does not end the Bill (the parliamentary-vs-presidential point). When the Governor merely declares "I withhold", the Bill does not die. This is because India is a parliamentary democracy, not a presidential one. The teacher's contrast: in the USA, the President has a pocket/qualified veto — he gets 10 days, and if he withholds within that window the Bill comes to an end there. But our President and Governor are not the real executives; they are required to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, so a bare "withhold" cannot kill the Bill. The first proviso to Art 200 attaches to "withhold": the Governor returns the Bill (with or without a message/suggestions) for reconsideration; and if the House re-passes it, the Governor "shall not withhold" assent. Even if he "withholds" and then does nothing, it is treated as if the Bill were returned without a message, and the Assembly can simply re-pass it.

TEACHER'S EXAMPLE (the "friend, philosopher and guide" observation): The court made a strong observation that the Governor acts as a "friend, philosopher and guide" to the State Legislature. The exam can hand you exactly this line — "The Governor acts as friend, philosopher and guide with respect to the State Legislature — elaborate." — and you would then explain the Governor's role through Art 200 (and any other provision of State working). His advice on a returned Bill is persuasive, not binding on the Assembly.

The impact of the Reference (the part left over from Class 3). Five points to carry:

  1. The 10 Tamil Nadu Bills remain law for now. They were given "deemed assent" by the 2-judge Division Bench and have been notified and are under implementation. They will continue as Acts unless and until the Governor of the State files a review petition against that Division-Bench decision. Nothing becomes void automatically in our system — you must challenge a decision in a court to get it nullified.
  2. A Presidential Reference (Art 143) is advisory, not adjudicatory. It was filed as an advisory reference, not as a review/revision (the difference between Art 137 review and Art 143 advice — see lec03). So it does not overrule the previous decision on those 10 Bills.
  3. But it does nullify the previous interpretation — the 1–3 month timelines the Division Bench had fixed for the Governor and President. Those timelines, set by 2 judges, now stand nullified by the 5-judge opinion. (Exam trap: "this advisory reference does not overrule the previous decision" is true; "it does not overrule the previous interpretation" is false — the interpretation/timeline is overruled, the decision on the 10 Bills is not.)
  4. Limited mandamus on prolonged inaction. On indefinite / prolonged / unexplained inaction, the State Government can approach the Supreme Court, and the Court can issue a limited mandamus — asking the Governor to act within a reasonable time (the Court can ask "is it by the next hearing?", backed by its contempt power) — without reviewing the merits of his discretion.
  5. No "deemed assent" via Art 142. The Court cannot use Art 142 to grant assent on the executive's behalf; doing so would create a deadlock between the judiciary and the Governor and would violate Art 50 (separation of the judiciary from the executive — judicial overreach).

TEACHER'S EXAMPLE (analogy to the Three Judges Cases / collegium): This "advice clarifies/overrules the interpretation but not the decision" logic is exactly like the collegium evolution. The teacher recalled three of the four cases: the First Judges Case (about transfer of HC judges — held the CJI's opinion is not binding); the Second Judges Case (SC Advocates-on-Record Assn v. Union of India) — the earlier view was overruled, the CJI's opinion held binding, with a collegium; and the Third Judges Case (a Presidential Reference, 1998) where the Court clarified the CJI's opinion is binding only if it is in accordance with the collegium, and the collegium was expanded. The point of the analogy: a later authoritative opinion supersedes the earlier interpretation for all future cases, while the specific past decision stands.

CLARIFICATION (the Art 174 vs Art 163 "tail"): Do not mix up the President and the Governor. The languages of Art 74 (Union) and Art 163 (State) are almost identical, except for a "tail" added in the State provision. Art 74 says the President shall act in accordance with the Council of Ministers' advice → so advice is binding on the President. Art 163 says there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor "except in so far as he is required to act in his discretion" → so the Governor has discretion, which is why he can reserve/withhold a Bill against the State CoM's advice.

EXAM FOCUS (Prelims — the count): This was the 16th Presidential Reference; the handout lists all 15 earlier ones (Delhi Laws Act 1912 … Punjab Termination of Agreement Act 2004 — see the lec03 REFERENCE box). Of the 14 questions, the SC answered 12 (the teacher's count includes Q13 answered-by-reference-to-Q10) and returned 2 (Q12 on Art 145(3); Q14 on jurisdiction outside Art 131) as irrelevant to the reference.


2. High Courts — Number & the Relevant Articles (214, 230, 231, 241)

EXAM FOCUS: This whole High-Court block is largely Prelims/factual — lock the article numbers and the state/UT lists.

Article 214 — "There shall be a High Court for each State." If you apply that logic literally, with 28 States plus the ~7–8 Union Territories, India "should" have around 36 High Courts. But we have only 25. The gap exists for exactly two reasons, which become the two factual sub-topics below:

  • a single (common) High Court can serve two or more States, and
  • a High Court can also have jurisdiction over a Union Territory (a State and a UT, or shared between UTs).

CLARIFICATION (verified): India currently has 25 High Courts. (Art 215 makes every HC a Court of Record; Art 216 — a HC consists of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the President appoints.) The official names of the older High Courts have not been changed even though the city/State names did — so it remains Madras High Court, Calcutta High Court, Bombay High Court (you do not rename them on your own; only an amendment can).

The four law-making Articles to keep straight (note which Part of the Constitution each sits in, because the exam tests that):

Need Article Part What it does
HC for each State 214 VI "There shall be a High Court for each State."
Common HC for 2+ States 231 VI Parliament may by law establish a common High Court for two or more States (or States + a UT).
Extend / exclude a HC's jurisdiction over a UT 230 VI Parliament by law may extend or exclude the jurisdiction of a High Court to/from a Union Territory.
Create an exclusive HC for a UT 241 VIII Parliament by law may create/establish a HC for a UT, or declare any HC of a State as the HC for that UT.

TEACHER'S EXAMPLE (the two MCQ-style framings): "If we have to create a High Court for a Union Territory, which Article applies?"Art 241 (UTs are in Part VIII, so the exclusive article is 241; e.g. the Delhi High Court exists as an exclusive HC for the UT under this logic). "If we have to extend an existing State's High Court over a UT?"Art 230 (Part VI). And "a High Court for two or more States?"Art 231.


3. High Courts with Jurisdiction over Two+ States and over Union Territories

(a) High Courts covering two or more States — Art 231

High Court States covered
Punjab & Haryana HC Punjab + Haryana
Bombay HC Maharashtra + Goa
Guwahati HC four States — Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh

EXAM FOCUS (the favourite trick — Guwahati): A common MCQ asks how many States the Guwahati HC covers, with options like 3 / 4 / 7. The answer is 4 (Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh) — not the old "seven sisters" figure. Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura got their own separate High Courts on 23 March 2013, so the Guwahati HC's jurisdiction shrank to these four. (Don't pick "all seven North-Eastern States" — that is the trap.)

(b) High Courts with jurisdiction over a Union Territory — Art 230

High Court Union Territory
Punjab & Haryana HC Chandigarh
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh HC J&K + Ladakh
Kerala HC Lakshadweep
Bombay HC Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu (now a single merged UT)
Madras HC Puducherry
Calcutta HC Andaman & Nicobar Islands
Delhi HC exclusive jurisdiction over the NCT of Delhi

CLARIFICATION (Delhi is the exception): Delhi is the only Union Territory with its own exclusive High Court (created under the Art-241 logic). Every other UT shares its High Court with a State (or with another UT). The teacher's note: if a UT is later upgraded to a State, it simply shifts into the "common HC" category until it gets its own — so these lists can change over time, which is why you remember them as two distinct lists. Applying logical reasoning, some HCs appear in both lists — e.g. Punjab & Haryana HC (two States plus the UT of Chandigarh) and Bombay HC (Maharashtra + Goa plus the UT).


4. Jurisdiction of a High Court (Original, Appellate, Writ 226, Supervisory 227/235)

A High Court has four major heads of jurisdiction — fewer than the Supreme Court, but with one head the SC does not have explicitly.

DIAGRAM (board): "Jurisdiction of High Court → Original / Appellate (civil, criminal) / Writs (226 → fundamental + legal rights) / Supervisory (227, 235 → subordinate courts)"; alongside, the note that on the Supreme Court side there are revisory + advisory (which the HC lacks), and the single/division/constitution-bench comparison.

Jurisdiction of a High Court — clean diagram

1. Original jurisdiction. Unlike the SC's original jurisdiction (which is federal in nature, Art 131), the High Court's original jurisdiction rests on two grounds:

  • Monetary value — civil disputes of high value start directly at the High Court. The present threshold is ₹2 crore and above (e.g. a disputed house/property worth ₹2 crore+, a family-succession or partition dispute). Such high-value matters are barred at the subordinate-court level and begin at the HC.
  • Statutory provisions — e.g. an election petition challenging the election of a winning candidate. The teacher's illustration: an MLA's election dispute would normally start at the Election Commission, but if you miss the (~40-day) window there, the petition starts at the High Court as an original matter.

TEACHER'S EXAMPLE (the ₹2 cr → ₹20 cr proposal): Because real-estate/housing values keep rising, every property dispute now lands directly in the High Court, over-burdening it. So there was a proposal to raise the original-jurisdiction limit from ₹2 crore to ₹20 crore, diverting the workload back to the subordinate courts. But it was opposed/agitated by members of the Bar Councils at various High Courts — because economic interest is attached: an advocate can charge higher fees in the High Court than in a subordinate court, so they resist the delegation. (Use as a "vested-interest" example in a judicial-reform answer.)

CLARIFICATION: The ₹2-crore figure is the ordinary original civil jurisdiction limit that some chartered High Courts (e.g. Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Delhi) carry; it is fixed by statute/rules and varies by High Court, not a uniform constitutional number. Treat the teacher's "₹2 crore and above" as the working figure he used; the principle (value-based + statutory) is the exam point.

2. Appellate jurisdiction. The High Court hears civil and criminal appeals from the subordinate courts. Note the contrast with the SC: at the SC, appeals are neatly split into constitutional / civil / criminal (Arts 132 / 133 / 134); at the HC the appellate power flows from statutory provisions — now the BNSS (which has replaced the CrPC) — not from a dedicated constitutional article.

3. Writ jurisdiction — Article 226. The HC can issue writs for both Fundamental Rights and legal rights. This makes the HC's writ jurisdiction WIDER than the Supreme Court's, because the SC's writ power under Art 32 is for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights only.

4. Supervisory jurisdiction — Articles 227 & 235. This is the head unique to the High Court — the power to supervise the working of the subordinate courts. Concretely, the HC participates in the appointment, transfer and disciplinary action against subordinate-court judges:

  • the Chief Justice of the HC is consulted for the appointment of a subordinate-court judge;
  • transfer of a subordinate-court judge from one district to another is handled by the State collegium (the HC);
  • a disciplinary action is carried out by the Governor / State Government on the advice of the High Court.

This power flows from two articles working together — Art 227 (from the High Court's side) and Art 235 (control over subordinate courts). The Supreme Court does not have this explicit supervisory power. (The SC collegium does participate in High Court judges' appointment (Art 217) and transfer (Art 222), but that flows from judicial interpretation/collegium, not from an explicit supervisory provision.)

CLARIFICATION (removal still needs the legislature — Justice Yashwant Varma): Even where the supervisory chain runs through the HC/SC, removal of a judge is not in the judiciary's hands. Even if the Supreme Court recommends removing a judge, the judge is removed only if both Houses of Parliament pass the removal resolution. The recent example is Justice Yashwant Varma (the "cash-at-residence" row, March 2025): the in-house committee found against him, 146 MPs signed a removal motion (admitted 12 Aug 2025), but it took over a year to reach that stage, and he resigned first (effective immediately) — halting the parliamentary process. Had he not, he might have been the first judge removed by a resolution of both Houses. (For a subordinate-court judge, by contrast, removal does not require a State-legislature resolution — the HC handles it.)

CLARIFICATION (judges' immunity while in office): A sitting judge is protected under the Judges (Protection) Actno investigation/FIR can proceed without the prior approval of the Chief Justice of the High Court / Supreme Court. Once a person is no longer a judge (as with Justice Varma after resignation), FIRs and other proceedings can be filed. (The teacher flagged he'd cover the protections in detail under "powers of the CJI" in a later class.)


5. Benches of a Court (Single / Division / Constitution) + the Collegium-RTI point

A quick Prelims comparison of bench sizes at the High Court vs the Supreme Court:

Bench High Court Supreme Court
Single bench 1 judge (the SC does not sit in single-judge benches)
Division bench 2 judges 2 judges
Constitution bench CJ (HC) + 2 minimum 5 judges
  • A single-judge bench decision of a HC can be taken to a division bench of the same HC — and that is an appeal, not a review (a useful Prelims distinction in "layman" language traps).
  • A High Court is also a Constitutional Court — it can decide constitutional questions (e.g. a challenge to a Fundamental Right), and such a matter is taken by a Constitution bench headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court.
  • The largest bench ever was 13 judges in Kesavananda Bharati. The minimum for a Constitution bench is 5.

CLARIFICATION (145(3), not "142(3)"): The board shorthand wrote "142(3)", but the article that fixes the minimum 5-judge Constitution bench for a substantial question of law is Art 145(3). Art 142 is the separate "complete justice" power (the one mis-used for "deemed assent" in the T.N. matter). This very point was Question 12 of the Presidential Reference — should the T.N. matter (decided by 2 judges) first have gone to a 5-judge bench under Art 145(3)? — which the SC returned unanswered as irrelevant to the reference. The CJI is the "master of the roster" who allocates cases to benches.

CLARIFICATION / CURRENT AFFAIRS (collegium discussions & RTI — "yesterday's judgment"): The teacher flagged a fresh ruling that the collegium's discussions are NOT subject to the RTI Act — the reasons on which it decides, say, a judge's transfer from one HC to another cannot be disclosed or challenged on that basis. He invited a critical evaluation: the RTI Act defines a "public authority" as any body created by/under the Constitution, by a law of Parliament, or by an executive order, and financed (taxation) by the government — and the Supreme Court is a constitutional body financed by the exchequer; so on what mechanism is it not a public authority? He marked this as a potential judicial-overreach / constitutional-morality angle and a likely future RTI-vs-judiciary issue worth carrying for answer-writing. (Capture cautiously — verify the exact ruling before quoting it as settled.)


6. Subordinate Courts — Structure & Appointment (Arts 233, 234)

DIAGRAM (board): "Subordinate court → District & Sessions Court → Civil court (District court) / Criminal court (Sessions court); hierarchy: District Judge → Additional District Judge / Additional Sessions Judge; appointment of DJ = 233, other judges = 234."

Subordinate courts — structure & appointment (clean)

Structure. Under the broad head of subordinate courts, the civil side is the District Court and the criminal side is the Sessions Court. When the highest court in a district decides both kinds of matter, it is the District & Sessions Court — the highest authority within the district. Its internal hierarchy runs: District Judge → Additional District Judge → Additional Sessions Judge. (You can observe all of this in your own city's district courts.)

Appointment of a District Judge — Article 233. "The District Judge shall be appointed by the Governor in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction over the State." The qualifications to be a District Judge are either:

  • a judicial officer already in the State's service, or
  • an advocate (or pleader) for at least 7 years (recommended by the High Court).

CLARIFICATION ("pleader" vs "advocate"): The Constitution uses the older word "pleader" because, historically, the person who pleaded before the lower courts was a pleader. The Advocates Act, 1961 then defined "advocate" and folded the pleader into it (the Bar Council of India is the statutory regulator under that Act). So if a question writes "pleader", read it as "advocate" — they are the same for Art 233.

Appointment of judges other than District Judges — Article 234. "Appointments of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court and the State Public Service Commission." These judges are recruited through an open competitive examination conducted by the State Government (i.e., the State PSC prepares and conducts the exam; the HC is involved in interviews; the name finally goes to the Governor).

EXAM FOCUS (the one-line distinguisher): Art 233 → District Judge = Governor + High Court only. Art 234 → other (subordinate) judges = Governor + High Court + State PSC (open competitive exam). The extra player at the 234 level is the State Public Service Commission.


7. The Recruitment Ladder — a Single, Unified Judiciary

India has a single, unified judiciary: every tier is fed by two sourcespromotion of a sitting judge from the court below, and direct entry from the Bar — and the tiers connect into one continuous pyramid.

DIAGRAM (board): "Advocate / Judicial officer → District Judge (233/234) → 10 yr → High Court Judge → 5 yr → Supreme Court; two sources feeding each level."

Single & unified judiciary — recruitment ladder (clean)

Tier Source (a) — from the Bar Source (b) — promotion Then up to…
District Judge Advocate/pleader ≥ 7 yrs (Bar quota, Art 233(2)) Judicial officer promoted (entered via the Art-234 exam) High Court (after ~10 yrs)
High Court Judge Advocate ≥ 10 yrs in a High Court Subordinate-court judge ≥ 10 yrs Supreme Court (after ~5 yrs)
Supreme Court Judge Distinguished jurist / SC advocate ≥ 10 yrs High Court judge ≥ 5 yrs

A High Court judge may also be transferred between High Courts (Art 222) or elevated to the Supreme Court — so the whole structure is one continuous, unified judiciary, where a case moving up (or a judge changing) does not restart the trial (it continues from the court records — see lec03's "institutional memory" point).


8. Dheeraj Mor → Rejanish K.V. — Can a Sitting Judge use the Bar Quota? + the 3-Year-Practice Debate

EXAM FOCUS: This is the most exam-worthy single item of Class 4 — the answer flipped from "No" (2020) to "Yes" (2025), which is exactly the kind of "what changed" the exam loves. The teacher built it as a worked case-study heading: "Can a judicial officer with prior experience as a law officer be eligible for appointment as a District Judge under the Bar quota?"

DIAGRAM (board): the eligibility timeline — "advocate 8 yr → 9th yr SPSC judicial officer (234) → 11th yr vacancy for DJ under Bar quota → eligible? — 2020: rejected by SC; 2025: yes, by review."

Dheeraj Mor → Rejanish K.V. — Bar quota for a sitting judge (clean)

The scenario. A person practises as an advocate for ~8 years; during those years there is no vacancy in the District-Judge Bar quota, so he cannot be appointed. In the 9th year he clears the State PSC exam and becomes a judicial officer under Art 234. In the 11th year, a vacancy for District Judge under the Bar quota finally opens. He is now a sitting judge applying against a quota meant for advocates. Is he eligible?

2020 — Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (answer: NO). The Delhi High Court rejected his application, and a 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court agreed: the Bar quota is for a practising advocate, not for someone already in judicial service. "Advocates" and "law officers" were treated as one category, "judicial officers" as another; a sitting judge could not enter via the advocates' quota — he could only be promoted.

2025 — Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa (answer: YES — Dheeraj Mor overruled). In a fresh challenge, the Supreme Court reversed the 2020 position. The clarifications the teacher dictated (write these as the holding):

  1. A judicial officer with at least 7 years' experience as a law officer (advocate) before joining the judicial service is eligible for appointment as a District Judge under the seats reserved for advocates / pleaders.
  2. Eligibility is assessed at the time of application, and the combined experience of law-officer (Bar) + judicial service is counted.
  3. The experience acquired as a judicial officer through rigorous training is more valuable and comparable to that of a practising advocate.
  4. The State Government must frame rules in consultation with the High Court to implement this new interpretation, so that no candidate is discriminated against.

CLARIFICATION (the precise citation — verify before quoting): The teacher framed the 2025 ruling as a "review petition in Dheeraj Mor v. Delhi HC (2020)." More precisely, the overruling came in Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa (a batch of matters referred to a 5-judge Constitution Bench, decided 9 October 2025, CJI B.R. Gavai + 4 judges), which unanimously overruled Dheeraj Mor (2020). Its ratio: a combined 7 years of Bar practice + service qualifies an in-service judicial officer for the advocate-quota District-Judge post without resigning; the prior Bar experience keeps counting because the right to practise is "suspended, not terminated"; a minimum age of 35 applies; and Art 233(2) does not create a rigid advocate-only quota (a 75:25 balance is preserved). It applies prospectively (existing recruitments undisturbed). (So: substance of the teacher's point is correct; just cite Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2025 as the overruling case, with Dheeraj Mor, 2020 as the overruled one.)

TEACHER'S EXAMPLE (how the "combined experience" preference plays out): He stress-tested the rule with comparisons. (i) An applicant with 8 yrs advocate + 2 yrs as a judicial officer is preferred over one who was an advocate for 10 yrs but then quit to become a property dealer for 5 years — because the second person's experience is not in continuity with the appointment, so his trained value has lapsed. (ii) But a continuously practising advocate with 15 yrs would still out-rank the 8+2 candidate — far more experience. (iii) If two candidates are equal (say 10 + 10), the combined-experience rule (point 2 above) decides, since the minimum eligibility was only 7 years' practice. The thread: the Bar-quota seat must go to a genuinely eligible Bar-side candidate, and a trained sitting judge's time is treated as at least comparable to an advocate's.

EXAM FOCUS (the flip side — not yet decided): Can someone who practised as an advocate for 10 years and then became a District Judge later claim the High Court Bar quota? The teacher's view: this has not been challenged yet, so the present answer is "No" (the traditional view) — but if challenged in future, a new judgment could change it, exactly as Dheeraj Mor changed at the District-Judge level.

TEACHER'S EXAMPLE (the parallel 3-year-practice debate): Right after Dheeraj Mor was raised, the Bar Council began demanding a mandatory minimum 3 years of practice before a graduate can sit the lower-judiciary exam (earlier, a fresh law graduate could appear with no practice). The teacher laid out both sides: - For the rule: many candidates "have a law degree but don't know the law" — fresh entrants end up applying provisions the courts have already struck down (e.g. in domestic-violence / maintenance matters). Some real practice first → they learn how a trial actually runs. - Against the rule: an LL.B is already a 5-year programme; add 3 years of practice = 8 years before one can even compete. It also raises a gender concern — it can restrict women candidates, given the social/family pressure to marry during those years. - Status: several State judiciary exams were cancelled amid this churn, and the rule is currently under challenge in court. The two disputes (the Dheeraj Mor flip and the 3-year-practice rule) are running in parallel and feed each other in the news.


9. All India Judicial Service (AIJS) — Constitutional Route, Committees & Attempts

EXAM FOCUS: AIJS is a classic GS2 critical-evaluation question — "Do you agree that an All India Judicial Service will improve judicial efficiency? / Make a case for the AIJS." You need: the constitutional route, the committees, the past attempts, and a balanced for/against with a way-forward.

DIAGRAM (board): "Constitutional provision → Art 312 (resolution) + Art 309 (law) → AIJS for District Judge; personnel administration; executive parallel UPSC→DM/SP, SPSC→SDM/DSP."

Creating an AIJS — the constitutional route (clean)

EXAM FOCUS (a "safe vs correct" trap): "Is there a constitutional provision for an AIJS?" — answering "No" feels safe, but the correct answer is "Yes" (Art 312). If you say yes, be ready for the follow-up: which article? → 312.

Article 312 — the RESOLUTION. Art 312 is a special power of the Rajya Sabha: the Rajya Sabha may pass a resolution by special majority (2/3 of members present and voting) declaring it necessary in the national interest and authorising Parliament to create a new All India Service, including a judicial service. The words "including judicial service" were added by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, 1976. So the enabling provision already exists — only a law is now needed.

Article 309 — the LAW. The resolution under 312 only authorises; the actual service is created by law under Art 309, which empowers Parliament to regulate recruitment and conditions of service for Central Government services and All India Services (and the same article authorises a State legislature to regulate State civil/government services).

EXAM FOCUS (what kind of bill?): Creating the AIJS needs only an ordinary law (ordinary bill) under Art 309 — not a Constitutional Amendment Bill (Art 368), and not a Money/Financial Bill. (Logical reasoning shortcut: the enabling change to Art 312 was already done by the 42nd CAA in 1976; what remains is a plain law under 309, so the default is an ordinary bill.)

CLARIFICATION (verified detail to add): The 42nd CAA (1976) inserted clauses (3) and (4) into Art 312. Art 312(3) says the AIJS "shall not include any post inferior to that of a District Judge" (as defined in Art 236) — which is exactly why the teacher kept saying the AIJS applies only at the District-Judge level (Art 233), not the Art-234 level. Art 312(4) clarifies that such a law (which may amend Chapter VI of Part VI on subordinate courts) is not to be treated as a constitutional amendment under Art 368 — confirming the "ordinary bill" point.

What the service-law actually regulates — "personnel administration". Whatever law is made will govern the whole employee life-cycle: recruitment, training, salary & allowances, career advancement, disciplinary action, and transfer & posting. These together are "personnel administration" (personnel = the workforce). This is where the difference between service types shows up:

Service type Who controls personnel administration
Central Government services entirely the Government of India / Union
State Government services entirely the State
All India Services (dual control) recruitment + training + career advancement + disciplinary action → Union; salary/allowances + transfer/posting → State

There are presently three All India Services — IAS, IPS, and the Indian Forest Service (IFoS); an AIJS would be the fourth. Because the AIJS would sit at the District-Judge level, the teacher used the executive parallel: just as UPSC recruits the DM (IAS)/SP (IPS) while the State PSC recruits the SDM/DSP, an AIJS would be the all-India exam feeding the top of the district judiciary (the District Judge), with the State Judicial Service continuing below it.

TEACHER'S EXAMPLE (why AIJS attracts talent — the service-conditions point): At present a District Judge comes from only two sourcesadvocate (Bar quota) and State Judicial Service — and (as noted in the lec03 reforms) the absence of an AIJS fails to attract talented law graduates, because salary, allowances and service conditions of lower-court judges differ State to State (they are in the State's hands). Given a choice, aspirants prefer an all-India service for its better service conditions, recognition, money and promotion — the same reason people prefer the IAS over a State service. An AIJS member could start directly at the District-Judge level instead of waiting 10–15 years for promotion, so it raises both aspiration and quality.

TEACHER'S EXAMPLE (the 2:1 cadre-allotment + reservation digression): Explaining how AIJS posts would be distributed, he drew the IAS analogy: of 3 District-Judge vacancies in a State, roughly 2 go to outsiders and 1 to the insider (domicile) — the standard 2:1 cadre policy — and within the insider seat the reservation sequence (SC/ST/OBC/EWS) is followed. His larger point (a motivation aside): know the policy so you understand why a candidate with a better all-India rank may still miss an insider seat that goes to a reserved/insider candidate — and use that awareness to stay motivated and aim higher, not to feel demoralised.

Committees that recommended an AIJS (write as a list):

  1. The Law Commission of India — in its first report and again in its 8th report — recommended the creation of an AIJS.
  2. The 2nd ARC — in its report on Personnel Administration — recommended creating an AIJS (along with an All India Health Service and Medical Service).
  3. The M.M. Punchhi Commission (on Centre–State relations) — recommended an AIJS.

CLARIFICATION (the most-cited report + the SC's nudge): The single most-cited recommendation is the Law Commission's 116th Report (1986), "Formation of an All India Judicial Service." (The teacher's "first report" reference is to the early Law Commission work of the late 1950s; avoid quoting "1951" as a firm year — the 1st Law Commission was constituted in 1955.) The Supreme Court itself, in All India Judges' Association v. Union of India (1992), directed the Centre to set up an AIJS — a useful extra authority for a Mains answer.

Attempts made in the past. The Chief Justice of India convened a Conference of the Chief Justices of the various High Courts during 1961, 1963 and 1965 to build consensus on an AIJS (the aim: reduce HC pendency by attracting talented graduates to the district judiciary). The result:

  • 7 States supported it: Bihar, Haryana, Kerala, Odisha, Rajasthan, Punjab, Tamil Nadu (a mix of Hindi and non-Hindi States);
  • 10 States rejected it: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Karnataka, Nagaland, Maharashtra;
  • 3 States — Kerala, Punjab, Tamil Nadu — later withdrew their support (having initially supported it, they joined the opposing camp once the arguments were debated).

So the idea has been recommended repeatedly since the 1950s–60s but never implemented — which is exactly what makes "should we finally create the AIJS?" a live exam question.


10. AIJS — Critical Evaluation (Arguments Against & In Favour) + Exam Scheme

EXAM FOCUS: A critical-evaluation answer must be two-sided. Below, every "against" point has a matching "for" rebuttal — write them as a pair and then conclude in favour, offering the scheme of examination as the solution.

Arguments AGAINST the AIJS (the States' criticisms)

  1. Inadequate knowledge of the regional language would adversely affect judicial efficiency — especially in parole decisions and judicial pronouncements (a judge who can't follow the local language can't enforce/interpret well).
  2. Promotional avenues for the members of the State Judicial Service would be reduced — adversely affecting their morale and motivation (their path to District Judge gets occupied by AIJS direct recruits).
  3. It would affect the control of the High Court over the subordinate courts (the HC's supervisory jurisdiction).
  4. Recruitment from the Hindi belt would dominate the service.
  5. Bar members would be given postings outside their home State, creating inconvenience / a disincentive for them.
  6. It may increase the financial burden on the Consolidated Fund of the State, because the salary and allowances would be higher (≈ that of a District Magistrate / IAS officer).

Arguments IN FAVOUR of the AIJS (the rebuttals)

  1. Language is not an assessment of competence — it was used as an excuse to block the AIJS. It can be tested by conducting one exam in the regional language (language is a test of expression, not of IQ). (Indeed, English is the official language of the higher judiciary — a judge promoted to the HC/SC must work primarily in English — so candidates anyway need both.)
  2. A candidate from the State is eligible to compete for both the AIJS and the State Judicial Service — so the domicile gets an opportunity to directly become a District Judge. That is a source of motivation, not demoralisation.
  3. There is no threat to the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction — the HC would still be consulted for disciplinary action (and for the interview stage, under Art 235).
  4. A national approach and outlook is important for an integrated judiciary — AIJS officers would be promoted to the High Court and Supreme Court, improving overall judicial efficiency.
  5. Bar members are eligible for direct recruitment as District Judge under the Bar quota — so there is no question of being posted outside one's State or district against one's will.
  6. The higher salary and allowances are precisely what is needed to attract talented law graduates to aspire to the judiciary; they would be equivalent to the IAS.
  7. A workable scheme of examination can be designed (below) — which itself answers most of the objections.

The proposed Scheme of Examination (the way-forward)

To make the AIJS feasible, the teacher gave a concrete exam design (his "way forward"):

  • (a) Four papers of law(1) Constitutional law, (2) Civil law and related matters, (3) Criminal law and related matters, and (4) Regional laws along with customs and traditions (no ethics paper needed).
  • (b) The first three papers in English; the fourth paper in the regional language, to assess knowledge of the region and its language.
  • (c) Dual ranking — an All India Rank (on the 3 law papers) and a State Rank (on the 4th, regional, paper). (Worked illustration: a candidate with All-India rank 5 / State rank 32 is more eligible than one with All-India rank 1001 / State rank 1 — the broad all-India performance carries more weight, while the domicile still gets a genuine edge.)
  • (d) A personality test / interview, conducted in consultation with the State High Court (this is what preserves the HC's role and neutralises objection #3).

REFERENCE (where the scheme comes from): This scheme of examination is inspired by the Law Ministry's proposal (the DJRE — District Judges Recruitment Examination, a "Central Selection Mechanism") that the Ministry submitted to the Supreme Court — the same DJRE/Central-Selection idea noted in the lec03 reforms.

EXAM FOCUS (how to conclude): The objections are really "excuses to reject"; the rebuttals show the AIJS is in the larger interest of society and is a long-pending reform. So conclude in favour — and offer the scheme of examination as the concrete solution.


11. Quick Revision Tables

Article-number cheat sheet (Prelims)

Article Topic
214 There shall be a High Court for each State
215 Every HC is a Court of Record
226 HC writ jurisdiction — Fundamental + legal rights (wider than SC's Art 32)
227 / 235 HC supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts
230 Parliament may extend/exclude a HC's jurisdiction over a UT (Part VI)
231 Parliament may establish a common HC for two or more States (Part VI)
241 Parliament may create a HC for a UT / declare a State HC as the UT's HC (Part VIII)
233 Appointment of District Judge — Governor + HC (advocate ≥ 7 yrs / judicial officer)
234 Appointment of other subordinate judges — Governor + HC + State PSC (open exam)
222 Transfer of a High Court judge between HCs
217 / 124 Appointment & qualifications — High Court / Supreme Court judges
145(3) Constitution bench — minimum 5 judges (substantial question of law)
312 All India Services incl. judicial service — RS resolution (special majority); 312(3): not below District Judge; 312(4): not a 368 amendment
309 Law on recruitment & conditions of service (Union/AIS; and States)

Key facts & numbers (for answer-writing)

Item Value
Number of High Courts 25
HCs over 2+ States Punjab & Haryana; Bombay; Guwahati (4 States)
Guwahati HC States Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh (Meghalaya/Manipur/Tripura split off 23 Mar 2013)
Only UT with an exclusive HC Delhi (NCT of Delhi)
HC original-jurisdiction value (working figure) ₹2 crore + (proposal to raise to ₹20 cr)
Present All India Services IAS, IPS, IFoS (AIJS would be the 4th)
District-Judge Bar-quota practice ≥ 7 years (advocate/pleader)
HC judge — practice / service ≥ 10 years
SC judge — HC service ≥ 5 years
AIJS — RS resolution majority 2/3 of members present & voting
"Judicial service" added to Art 312 42nd CAA, 1976
Most-cited Law Commission report on AIJS 116th Report, 1986
Past consensus attempts (CJI conferences) 1961, 1963, 1965 — 7 for / 10 against / 3 withdrew

Two cases to remember (the "what changed")

Case Year Held
Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi 2020 (3-judge) A sitting judicial officer CANNOT use the advocate/Bar quota for District Judge
Rejanish K.V. v. *K. Deepa* 2025 (5-judge Constitution Bench, 9 Oct) Overruled Dheeraj Morcombined 7 yrs (Bar + service) makes a judicial officer eligible under the advocate quota

Current Affairs

(Updated as relevant news/magazine content comes in)

Date Source Headline Connection to this topic
9 Oct 2025 Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa — 5-judge Constitution Bench overrules Dheeraj Mor (2020) §8 — Bar-quota eligibility of in-service judicial officers (Art 233)
Aug 2025 Justice Yashwant Varma removal motion admitted (146 MPs); he resigns §4 — removal of a judge needs a Parliament resolution; judges' immunity while in office
2025 Presidential Reference 2025 (Art 143) — impact & closure §1 — overlap with lec03; deemed-assent/Art-142 overreach, limited mandamus
Collegium discussions held outside RTI (reported ruling) §5 — RTI "public authority" debate; judicial-overreach angle
Recurring push for an All India Judicial Service (DJRE / Central Selection Mechanism) §9–10 — constitutional route, committees, for/against, exam scheme